Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes

Rachael Briggs (School of Philosophy, ANU)

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SEMINAR

DATE: 2013-10-16
TIME: 11:30:00 - 12:30:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU
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ABSTRACT:
Rachael presents her article Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes, Philosophical Review 2010 Volume 119, Number 1: 1-30 http://philreview.dukejournals.org/content/119/1/1.abstract

BIO:
Rachael Briggs earned her PhD in philosophy in 2009 from the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT. She held a postdoctoral fellowship in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney from 2009 to 2012, and joined the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University in 2012. She is also a member of the Institute for Integrated and Intelligent Systems at Griffith University. She is currently working on two Discovery Projects, funded by the Australian Research Council. Wellbeing, Preferences, and Basic Goods is a book-length project defending desire-satisfaction theories of wellbeing. Decision Theory in Crisis, held jointly with Daniel Nolan and Alan HAjek, is a general investigation into the foundations of causal decision theory. Her other research interests include truthmaking, judgment aggregation, the logic of counterfactuals, and the metaphysics of chance.